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Introduction
In the past two decades the major policy response to high unemployment rates in Europe has been the reduction of Employment Protection Legislation (henceforth EPL) through the liberalisation of temporary contracts. 1 A large literature has established the importance of temporary contracts in a¤ecting job ‡ows by increasing both the hiring and the …ring of workers. Although much less researched in theory and in practice, it is plausible that temporary contracts also have a bearing on …rms' capital investment decisions, on the capital-labour ratio and, eventually, on productivity. While the e¤ects of EPL on productivity have been assessed in the past (see Autor et al., 2007 , Bassanini et al., 2009 , and Cingano et al., 2010 , the productivity impact of temporary contracts liberalisation has never been evaluated using …rm-level data and we are the …rst to provide this type of evidence.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the e¤ects of the institutional changes of two di¤erent types of temporary contracts which constitute the core of recent labour market policy in Italy. We analyse the e¤ects of these changes on job ‡ows, employment, capital-labour substitution and productivity. A further contribution of this paper is that we estimate the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of temporary contracts. Economic models necessarily simplify the actual use of temporary and permanent contracts and consider one single type of temporary contract. However in practice in all countries there exist di¤erent types of temporary contracts, typically the result of repeated attempts at making the labour market more ‡exible leaving the open-end contracts untouched. Italian employers can use four types of temporary contracts with di¤erent characteristics: apprenticeships (Apprendistato), …xed-term (Tempo Determinato), collaboration workers (Collaborazioni Coordinate e Continuative, the so called co.co.co, a sort of consultant hired on a temporary basis) and temporary agency jobs (Interinali). These contracts di¤er along various dimensions such as illness provisions, minimum wages, age restrictions, temporal limits and number of allowed repetitions of the same contract. The perception among labour lawyers and entrepreneurs is that they are highly substitutable but so far there is no hard evidence of this.
We have …rm-level data on the use of the four di¤erent types of temporary 3 labour contracts and on permanent ones and we show that the e¤ect of the reform of one type of labour contract may work also through the substitution with other types. This is the …rst paper, as far as we know, which studies the substitutability across di¤erent types of temporary contracts and highlights the potential consequences of a high elasticity of substitution.
We …nd that the reform of apprenticeship contracts has been successful because it increased the turnover of workers easing the adjustment process of …rms, encouraged the substitution of external sta¤ with apprentices and eventually increased productivity. The reform of …xed-term contracts, instead, does not seem to have had the intended results. The fact that the implementation of the national law required approval through collective bargaining rounds and that the new contract itself was subject to high degree of uncertainty may have altered the original spirit of the law and made the use of …xed-term contracts less costly but more "risky". This reform reduced overall job turnover, induced substitution with permanent workers and a lower use of capital per worker, which eventually reduced all measures of …rm-level productivity (value added per worker, revenues per worker, TFP).
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature, in Section 3
we describe the institutional changes, in Section 4 we describe the data, in Sections 5 and 6 we present, respectively, the estimation framework and the results and we conclude in Section 7.
Related literature
Temporary contracts are typically used for di¤erent reasons: for screening purposes, to temporarily …ll in for sta¤ who are absent or leave, or to accommodate ‡uctuations in demand. In many cases employers also save in labor costs and social security bene…ts using temporary contracts (Houseman, 2001 ). Temporary jobs inhibit labor market advancement if these jobs displace more productive employment activities. However they may also increase employment and earnings if they substitute for spells of unemployment. The e¤ect of temporary contracts on productivity depends on whether temporary positions on average complement or displace permanent jobs. In this respect the literature on temporary jobswhich mostly looks at the employment e¤ects rather than wage e¤ects -is very heterogenous and does not draw a general conclusion.
Using a natural experiment Autor and Houseman (2010) (Lazear, 1990 ). 3 Because part of EPL constitutes a tax that goes to third parties -lawyers and administrative costs -EPL is by all means an adjustment cost and there is overwhelming evidence that it reduces the volatility of employment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 contracts, in practice it made the requirements for the use of these contracts too generic, which inevitably produced uncertainty over the contents of the legislation and how to apply it (Aimo, 2006) . Uncertainty over the contents has generated di¤erent interpretations of the decree, in particular on whether or not employers could recruit workers on …xed-term contracts without necessarily demonstrating the temporary nature of the work performed by those employed on those contracts.
As noted by experts in labour law, this uncertainty may have reversed the originally intended e¤ect of the reform, making the use of this type of contracts more costly, rather than less costly, to …rms.
The second change introduced by the decree, which is of particular interest here, is that it has restrained the scope for unions to a¤ect the implementation of national law provisions through collective bargaining that takes place at the industry level. Under the previous legislation, collective bargaining agreements could list additional 'reasons'for the use of …xed-term contracts over and above those contained in the national legislation. Given that unions enjoy broad powers within collective bargaining agreements, they could-and actually did-make the application of …xed-term contracts within a given industry more restrictive than what was established at the national level. The decree abolished the possibility of including additional 'reasons' through collective bargaining, thereby reducing union power and increasing the freedom of employers to use …xed-term contracts.
We evaluate the e¤ects of this reform using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences research design. The case of the new …xed-term contracts lends itself to this type of analysis since in order to become applicable in a given industry, the new decree needed to be implemented through the national contracts for that industry. Therefore, only industries with national contracts negotiated after the decree was legislated, could 
The ' new'apprenticeship contract
Legislation to regulate apprenticeship contracts has existed for a long time and has also been reformed several times. The lower labour costs associated with these contracts make them particularly convenient to employers. These lower labour costs are intended to compensate …rms for the training costs that they incur. Firms are required to share training costs by giving apprentices time o¤ work (for a mini-mum number of paid hours) to attend external training courses that are provided by local authorities or accredited training institutes (and sponsored by the regions) outside the premises of the …rm. At the end of the training period, apprentices should receive a certi…cate for the quali…cation they have attained. There are, nevertheless, limitations on this formal training activity: lack of public funding for training, a lack of infrastructures for training courses and little control over compliance with compulsory training obligations by …rms using these contracts.
As a consequence most of the training is in the form of the on-the-job type. 
Data and descriptive statistics
The data set used in this paper is a balanced panel of about 13,000 …rms in the value added, revenues and net physical capital stock.
Based on this information we can construct two treatment dummies capturing the exposure of …rms to the two reforms discussed in the previous Section. We identify exposure to the reform of …xed-term contracts using …rms'sectoral a¢ liation. have reached national agreements afterwards, and we also include these …rms in the treatment group.
In Table 1 we provide a description of the data. We begin by grouping …rms on the basis of their exposures to the reforms, distinguishing never treated …rms from …rms treated by the apprenticeships reform and those exposed to the reform of …xed-term contract. Since a …rm may be exposed to both reforms, the sum of the numbers in the three groups exceed the number in the full sample. There 
Estimation framework
We are interested in assessing the impact of the two reforms on measures of job turnover, production inputs and productivity. As documented in the previous Sections, we can exploit in a di¤erence-in di¤erences set-up the di¤erential variation in exposure to the reforms across regions and sectors over time. Let d 
where Y is an outcome measure, the coe¢ cients measure the e¤ects of the two reforms on the outcome, t is a time …xed e¤ect, Z r i and Z s i are dummy variables for regions and sectors, so that the coe¢ cients capture regional (r) and sectoral (s) …xed e¤ects, while the coe¢ cients capture region-and sector-speci…c time trends, X it is a vector of controls and " it is an error term. Whenever the outcomes of interest are in levels we also include …rms …xed e¤ects, whereas in the case for variables derived from di¤erencing levels, like job turnover, we control for the presence of repeated observation by …rms using a robust variance estimator.
We start by looking at job ‡ows as the outcome of interest. Speci…cally, we consider the year-to-year job turnover de…ned as in Davis et al. (1996) where E it is …rm i employment in year t.
This measure accounts for the absolute year-to-year employment change by recording annual net employment ‡ows. Since we have detailed information on the type of employment contracts, we are able to estimate the reforms'impact on employment ‡ows considering either total employment and employment in each contract type. This exercise enables an indirect assessment of the degree of substitutability between di¤erent types of employment contracts. In other words, the e¤ectiveness of reforms in one type of employment contract greatly depends on the extent to which …rms are able to substitute between contract types. Estimating the impact of reforming one type of contract on job ‡ows of another contract type is a way to assess the existence of substitution e¤ects across contracts. Next, our investigation will proceed by applying the estimating framework of equation (1) to other margins of …rms decision, namely employment levels (overall and by contract type), capital (total and per worker), investments (total and per worker) and the skill ratio de…ned as the ratio between non-manual and manual workers in the …rm. Applying equation (1) to this set of outcomes will o¤er a rather complete picture of the e¤ects of the two reforms on …rms production choices. Finally, we will focus our attention on the results of …rms activity, namely on various measures of productivity. Speci…cally we will consider value added per worker, revenues per worker and total factor productivity.
Assessing the validity of identi…cation
The validity of the identi…cation of (1) rests on the exogeneity of the reforms. In the ideal case, the reform adoption decisions (by the regions and the sectoral bargaining rounds) would be independent random events that varied in timing and had no spillover e¤ects to non-adopting regions or sectors. While …rm migration across sectors and regions to take advantage of the rules is highly unlikely, one possible concern is that the regions which had higher or lower than average employment growth in temporary contracts were also the same to adopt the reforms of the apprenticeship contract or of the …xed-term contract.
To dispel this doubt we use data from the Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1996-2007. We cannot use our …rm-level data because we need to observe several years of data prior to the reforms to control for pre-dating trends in employment in temporary contracts, whereas in the Excelsior database 2004 is the only pre-reform year. Therefore we use LFS data which, although based on individuals and not on …rms, are a representative sample of the Italian labour market. show a similar movement in the two series before the adoption of the two reforms in 2005 thus supporting the validity of our identi…cation strategy which is based on the assumption that the outcomes of interest would have otherwise evolved similarly in adopting and non-adopting regions and sectors. 4 To further prove that preceding trends in temporary employment do not predict the adoption of the reforms, we regress the two treatment dummies de…ned at the sectoral (for the …xed-term reform) or regional (for the apprenticeship reform) level on leads and lags of log employment in temporary contracts computed from the LFS. The coe¢ cients on the lags are relative to the period four years prior to the reform, and their pattern indicates whether the coe¢ cients associated with the reform in equation (1) are consistent with a causal interpretation. In particular, we would be concerned if there are large and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the lag indicators, regardless of whether they are positive or negative. The …rst two columns of Table 2 show the e¤ect of log temporary employment on the adoption of the apprenticeship contract reform. The results show that past temporary employment has no signi…cant e¤ect on the adoption of the reform. In the same way the third and fourth columns show that past temporary employment has no e¤ect on the adoption of the …xed-term contract reform. Overall, the evidence from both Figure 1 and Table 2 is consistent with a causal interpretation of the e¤ects that we are going to discuss in the next Section.
Results
We begin by assessing the impact of the two reforms on the level of job reallocation.
If the reforms decreased the costs of using certain types of temporary contracts, then we should expect an increase in the hiring and dismissal of workers with those same contracts, which in turn should result in an increase of employment ‡uctuations.
We next consider the e¤ects of the reforms on …rms employment, both at the aggregate level and by contract types. Furthermore, we also investigate the e¤ects of the reforms on some other margins of …rm adjustment along which theory does not give clear predictions and prior research has obtained mixed results: capital (total and per worker), investment (total and per worker) and the skill mix, de…ned as the ratio between non-manual and manual workers in the …rm.
After considering the impact of the reform on various dimensions of inputs to the production process, our analysis moves on to consider e¤ects on productivity, looking at both labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP).
Finally, we provide evidence on the interplay between …rms'production function and the various forms of labour contracts by estimating a the elasticity of substitution among temporary employment contracts and between these and permanent contracts. Table 3 provides results on job turnover. Panel A of the Table considers Table   shows that the reform of …xed-term contracts had an impact on the turnover of …xed-term workers only in contracting …rms. In sum, …rms treated by the reform of …xed-term contract increased turnover of …xed-term workers only if they were contracting total employment, whereas they used permanent contracts if they were expanding. Both facts suggest that this reform was not successful in stimulating …xed-term employment.
Job reallocation

Robustness
In Table 4 we assess the robustness of our …ndings on job turnover, focussing on turnover in total employment (Panel A), turnover in apprenticeships (Panel B) and turnover in …xed-term contracts (Panel C). In column (1) of the Table   we show results obtained after excluding from the sample …rms that displayed very low or very high levels of year to year change in capital levels, i.e. above or below the 99th or 1st percentile in the distribution of average capital changes.
Column (2) of the Table instead adds sources of …rms heterogeneity by controlling for (endogenous) …rms characteristics in terms of capital levels, value added and the skill mix. Alternatively, in Column (3) we control for time invariant …rm heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved) by using a …xed e¤ects estimator.
Finally, in Column (4) rather than considering absolute employment changes, we look at employment growth, i.e. we use the measure de…ned in the previous Section but without absolute values at the numerator.
Results for turnover in overall employment in Panel A are generally robust in that statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients remain signi…cant and maintain size and sign. In particular, Table 3 pointed towards a 0.5 p.p. penalty associated with the reform of …xed-term contracts, which is still evident in Columns (1) and (2). The e¤ect is smaller in size when the …xed e¤ect estimator is used, whereas it almost doubles in the growth regression (minus 0.9 p.p.).
Results on turnover of apprenticeships in Panel B are also robust across columns.
The most evident di¤erence with respect to the benchmark regression of Table 3 (Panel A, Column (4)) arises from the regression with …xed e¤ects, where the estimated coe¢ cient on the apprenticeship reform becomes about 1 p.p. smaller (from 3.1 to 1.8) while its standard error remains stable, resulting in an overall loss of statistical signi…cance. This coe¢ cient is estimated out of within-…rm variation over a relatively short time interval, while the dependent variable is derived from di¤erenced employment levels, thence it is not surprising that it loses signi…cance. 5 Overall, we can interpret …xed e¤ects estimates as corroborative of the evidence on turnover of apprenticeships produced in Table 3 .
Results from Panel C also point towards the robustness of the evidence on the reform of …xed-term contracts, the benchmark regression this time is Column (3) of Panel A in Table 3 . We can observe again that the e¤ect of the …xed-term reform loses signi…cance in the …xed e¤ects regression (both the point estimate and the standard error gain size, the latter relatively more) and remarks similar to the one for the apprenticeships reform also apply in this case. The e¤ect in Column (4) -where we use employment growth rather than turnover as dependent variable -is close to zero and non signi…cant, which is consistent with the evidence from Column (3) in Panel C of Table 3 that the reform increased turnover of …xed-term contracts only in declining …rms.
Employment levels
The overall e¤ect of the increase in turnover on the level employment is theoretically ambiguous because a higher turnover may imply a higher or lower net employment. To understand the employment e¤ects of the new legislation, in Table 5 we estimate regressions for …rms log employment. We consider both aggregate employment and employment in each of the type of contracts. All models include …rms …xed e¤ects. 6 The apprenticeship reform had a positive e¤ect on the net employment of apprentices: …rms exposed to this reform experienced an This evidence con…rms that the reform of …xed-term employment has not been successful in promoting the use of this type of contracts by …rms.
Investment, capital and skill ratio
We now explore the consequences of the reforms on other margins of …rms'adjustment such as capital, capital-labour substitution and investments: if reforms make the use of temporary workers easier and facilitate adjustment …rms may substitute out of capital with new (temporary) workers. Alternatively …rms may vary their skill ratio: this may happen if workers with certain skills tend to be concentrated in speci…c types of contracts, or if the easing of temporary contracts make the use of skills more or less intensive. A higher capital-labour ratio or a higher skill mix should also improve productivity.
In Table 6 Columns (1) and (2) we look at the e¤ects of the reforms on logcapital and the log capital-labour ratio. The reform of …xed-term contracts had a negative e¤ect on …rms'capital and the capital labour ratio, which decreased by 2.6 and 1.6 pp. In terms of the literature discussed in Section 2, the substitution e¤ect between capital and labour prevailed over the 'hold up'e¤ect. In Columns (3) and (4) we consider investment and investment per worker: since in the data we have information on net capital K, we de…ne investment as
we do not apply any depreciation rate. As was the case with capital, the reform of …xed-term contracts impacted negatively on investment, although standard errors are relatively large and the estimated coe¢ cients not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels.
These e¤ects of the …xed-term reform contrast with the ones from the reform of apprenticeships. In this case estimated coe¢ cients are smaller in size and never signi…cant from a statistical point of view. The last set of results in the Table   (Column 5) refers to a di¤erent substitution margin between skilled and unskilled workers. We …nd no e¤ects of the two reforms on the skill ratio. This is expected in that temporary contracts are popular among both white and blue collars, particularly of young age.
Labour productivity
We now turn in Table 7 to productivity measures, which possibly represent the most relevant benchmark to measure the economic implications of institutional changes. We consider three di¤erent measures of productivity. The …rst is labour productivity de…ned as real value added per worker. The second focuses on …rms sales and is de…ned as revenues per worker. Finally, we partial out the contribution of physical capital and build a measure of TFP as the residual of a regression of log value added on log capital and log employment. 7 Panel A of Table 7 shows that the apprenticeship reform has had a positive and signi…cant impact on all measures of productivity, between 0.9 p.p. and 1.6 p.p. in the case of sales per worker and TFP. 8 Results on the …xed term reform tell a completely di¤erent story, all coe¢ cients being negative, sizeable (between 2.4 and 3.5 p.p.) and statistically signi…cant.
Taken together with the results on employment turnover and employment levels, the productivity e¤ects con…rm that while the apprenticeship reform has been successful, the reform of …xed-term contracts generated e¤ects that were opposite to expectations. To further assess the causal interpretation of our …ndings, in
Panel B of Table 7 we use lagged values of the treatment indicators in place of current values. In this way we avoid picking up any simultaneity between institutional changes at the sectoral or regional level and productivity growth. Results are robust to the use of lagged treatment indicators, the only coe¢ cient which loses signi…cance is the one for the e¤ect of the apprenticeship reform on revenues per worker.
A possible interpretation of these results is the following. The increase in the number of apprenticeships occurred through substitution of external sta¤, mainly collaboration workers. The rise in productivity that we observe is likely to re ‡ect a compositional shift in labour quality because our labour productivity measures do not adjust for the quality of labour inputs. To the extent that external collaborators have lower attachment to the …rm and exert lower e¤ort, the reform of apprenticeship may have induced …rms to shed this unproductive labour in exchange for more motivated apprentices. Although we do not have direct evidence of this, higher workers'e¤ort is plausibly the mechanism that may have increased of external sta¤ is di¤erent from the one of the …rm, e.g. service sector for external sta¤ and manufacturing for the …rm. We obtained virtually identical results in the two cases, and we present only those obtained using the overall number of workers. The negative productivity e¤ects of the reform of …xed-term contracts are less clear-cut. In this case, we know that …rms treated by this reform increased job turnover along this margin only if they were declining, while they were more oriented toward hiring permanent workers if they were expanding. This substitution across contract types may have been an unintended consequence of the reform, stemming from the increased uncertainty on the applicability of …xed-term contracts brought about by the reform. In parallel, these …rms have also reduced capital intensity, which may have induced the observed productivity decline.
Substitution e¤ects
The reform of apprenticeship induced substitution of external sta¤ (agency workers and collaborators) with apprentices. The reform of …xed-term contracts increased job ‡ows of …xed-term contracts but reduced signi…cantly total turnover. Nondeclining …rms increased turnover of permanent workers. These results suggest substitutability between permanent and temporary contracts and among temporary contracts of various types, which is something that has always been known among employers but has never been investigated by economists.
In order to provide a direct assessment of substitution e¤ects across di¤erent types of contracts, we also estimate the parameters of a production function in capital and labour. We allow labour inputs to di¤er according to the contract type, distinguishing between permanent and temporary employment contracts and, within temporary contracts, among the four types of temporary contracts that are available to …rms. In other words we estimate a simple production function where the four types of temporary contracts are partial substitutes and the entire group of temporary contracts is substitutable for permanent contracts. We model the 27 substitution across type of labour contracts using a nested CES technology:
where Q is the value added, K is capital, L p is permanent labour and L represents four types of ‡exible labour (agency workers, collaborators, apprentices, …xed-term). Using this nested CES speci…cation, parameters and govern the substitution process between labour inputs. In particular = In the economics literature there are plenty of studies on substitutions elasticities across factors of production. There are no studies though on the substitution across di¤erent types of temporary contracts. The most famous studies which look at labour factors of di¤erent types, tipically di¤erent education levels, …nd elasticities of substitution between college-educated and high-school educated workers in the US in the range of 0.5 to 2.5 (Katz and Murphy, 1992 , …nd a value of 1.4).
These estimates are typically obtained under the assumption of the labor market being on the relative demand curve and using information on wage bill shares.
With this method the conditional factor demand also include changes in prices or quantities of other inputs such as capital and energy. We do not have information on relative prices of all inputs (types of temporary contracts) therefore we estimate the elasticity using a simple CES function but we control for capital thus we control for substitution possibilities across other inputs.
Discussion and conclusion
The overall picture emerging from our analysis shows that the reform of apprenticeship contracts has been successful because it increased the turnover and the net employment of apprentice workers. These results suggest that the reform actually reduced the cost of apprenticeship contracts and …rms were encouraged to substitute external temporary sta¤ with apprentices. Although the capital-labour ratio remained una¤ected, the reform increased labour productivity possibly through one of the mechanisms suggested in the literature, for example increasing average worker e¤ort through the employment of more motivated workers (i.e. apprentices facing the prospects of training and wage growth) to replace external less motivated sta¤. The reform of …xed-term contracts instead does not seem to have had the intended results: the reform reduced labour turnover, reduced the capitallabour ratio and had a strong negative e¤ect on productivity. This suggests that the reform may have made the use of …xed-term contracts more costly rather than less costly as already pointed out by some of the literature on labour law. 9 If re-allocation of labour is important and the reform of …xed-term contracts hampers job reallocation across and within …rms (for example because it raises the costs of consultancy for fear of the courts), then productivity falls. Indeed, …nding a negative e¤ect of …xed-term contracts on job reallocation is a pre-requisite for claiming that higher costs hamper the optimisation of resources and allocative e¢ ciency (Bertola, 1990) . The dependent variable is the measure of workers ‡ow de…ned in the text. All regressions include controls for time, region and industry dummies and region-and industry-speci…c time trends. In column 1 we trim …rms with annual capital change below the 1st and above the 99th percentile. In column 2 we add value added, capital and the ratio of white collar to blue collar as regressor; in column 4 we use employment growth rather than job turnover as dependent variable. Robust variance estimates account for repeated observation on the same …rm over time. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of the number of employees by di¤erent contract. All regressions include controls for time, region and industry dummies plus region-and industry-speci…c time trends and …rm …xed e¤ects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are in logs, TFP is a residual of a log regression (see text for details). All regressions include controls for time, region and industry dummies plus region-and industry-speci…c time trends and …rm …xed e¤ects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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